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Abstract
We propose the use of Nitzan’s (1991) sharing rule in collective contests as a
tractable way of modeling individual contests. This proposal (i) tractably intro-
duces noise in Tullock contests when no closed form solution in pure strategies
exists, (ii) satisfies the important property of homogeneity of degree zero, (iii) can
be effort or noise equivalent to a standard Tullock contest.
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1 Introduction
Suppose N players participate in a contest by exerting costly effort to win a prize of
common value V . A crucial modeling element in such setups is the contest success
function (CSF), fi, mapping the vector of non-negative efforts to the probability that
player i ∈ N wins the prize (i.e., fi : RN+ → [0, 1] such that
∑
i∈N fi(.) = 1). In the CSF
proposed by Tullock (1980),
f ri (e1, ..., eN) =
eri∑N
j=1 e
r
j
if
N∑
j=1
ej > 0 and 1/N otherwise (r-function)
where ei ≥ 0 denotes the effort exerted by player i and r ≥ 0 determines the level of
noise. If r = 0 then the noise is maximum and players face a fair lottery. If r →∞ then
there is no noise and the highest effort wins with certainty (an all-pay auction). Different
levels of noise can be introduced for intermediate values.
Although the importance of noise when modeling contests is widely accepted, Tullock’s
otherwise tractable proposal leads to certain modeling challenges: First, when more than
two players with asymmetric costs compete, a closed form solution for the equilibrium
in pure strategies exists only if r = 1. That is, the introduction of noise in asymmetric
multiplayer contests becomes intractable. Second, when only two players compete, an
equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist for high levels of noise.
Here we propose the allocation of a prize among group members in collective con-
tests as introduced by Nitzan (1991) as a way of addressing these challenges. While
guaranteeing tractability, we show that (i) this proposal can be effort or noise equivalent
to an r-contest and (ii) several axiomatic and equilibrium properties are similar to Tul-
lock’s original proposal. These results differentiate this proposal to a similar approach
by Amegashie (2006) as based on Dasgupta and Nti (1998):
fαi (e1, ..., eN) =
ei + α∑N
j=1 ej +Nα
(α-function)
where α > 0 is the introduced “tractable” noise parameter.
From an axiomatic perspective, the r-CSF satisfies all desirable properties of imperfect
discrimination, anonymity, monotonicity, homogeneity of degree zero (HD0) and Luce’s
axiom (Skaperdas, 1996). Achieving noise tractability using the α-function requires the
sacrifice of HD0. However, HD0 is desirable for contests where the result should be
scale invariant, for instance when it should be irrelevant whether effort expenditures
are measured in euros or in dollars or whether effort levels are measured in hours or
2
minutes (see among others Hirshleifer 2000; Malueg and Yates 2006; Alcalde and Dahm
2007; Bevia´ and Corcho´n 2015). HD0 is thus viewed as an essential property whenever
outlays are in quantifiable units such as money or time. Our proposal satisfies HD0, while
sacrificing Luce’s axiom. Hence, researchers and contest designers may choose between
the current proposal and the α-CSF as alternative ways of introducing “tractable” noise
depending on the importance of HD0 versus Luce’s axiom. Moreover, and in contrast to
the α-function, we show that our proposal can be effort or noise equivalent to Tullock’s
original proposal.
2 The λ-contest
Following Nitzan (1991) we define
fλi (e1, ..., eN) = λ
ei∑N
j=1 ej
+(1−λ) 1
N
if
N∑
j=1
ej > 0 and 1/N otherwise (λ-function).
As discussed, and compared to the α-CSF, it is easy to show that the λ-function satisfies
HD0.1 Assume linear cost functions with ci > 0 denoting the marginal cost of player i,
and without loss of generality assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cN , we can define player’s i
payoff in the λ-contest as:2
piλi = f
λ
i (e1, ..., eN)V − ciei (1)
If λ ∈ [0, 1], then the λ-function satisfies the properties of a CSF and is a convex com-
bination of the most common version of a Tullock CSF (r = 1) and of a fair lottery
(r = 0).3 Parameter λ is associated to the level of noise in the competition and clearly
resembles the effect of r in the r-contest. Low values of λ are associated with high levels
of noise. Note however that λ need not be restricted in the [0, 1] interval. When λ > 1
the proposed function fλi may take values outside [0, 1] and therefore can not be inter-
preted as a CSF representing probabilities. If λ > 1, then the proposed function allows
for transfers among group members or the presence of a compulsory participation fee
(Appelbaum and Katz, 1986; Hillman and Riley, 1989). Since this may imply a negative
expected payoff for some contestants our setup may violate voluntary participation and
1The λ-function can be obtained from Bevia´ and Corcho´n (2015) by setting α = 1N , s = 1 and
β = N−1N λ and the HD0 property can be found from there.
2For the reasons of interpretability, players’ heterogeneity is introduced through cost asymmetries.
This is equivalent to asymmetries in terms of valuations (Gradstein, 1995; Corcho´n, 2007).
3Amegashie (2012) proposes a nested two-player contest that ranges from a Tullock to an all-pay
auction. A similar structure can also be found in Grossmann (2014) with a nested α-contest.
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hence, as Hillman and Riley (1989) argue, is relevant in situations that involve winners
and losers. If one does not want to model such transfers and interpret the λ-function as
a CSF then λ needs to be restricted to the [0,1] interval.
2.1 Equilibrium
The λ-contest as presented by its payoffs in (1) has been previously solved in Hillman
and Riley (1989).4
Remark 1. [Hillman and Riley (1989)]
Denote the cost-weighted prize valuations by Vi =
λV
ci
, there exists a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies with player’s i effort given by:
ei =
(
1− 1
Vi
(M − 1)∑M
j=1
1
Vj
)
(M − 1)∑M
j=1
1
Vj
(2)
where M is the number of active players. Player M is the highest marginal cost player
for whom the condition VM >
(M−2)∑
i≤M−1
1
Vj
holds.
Using the λ-contest one can solve for the equilibrium efforts in closed form in any
asymmetric multiplayer contest. This is not possible in the r-contest. Comparing equi-
librium properties across the three (r, α and λ) ways of modeling contests the following
results arise:
1. Individual and aggregate effort decreases with the level of noise in both the α
and λ-contest. This is different for r-contest where for the two player r-contest
comparative statics of aggregate effort with respect to noise levels depend on the
degree of asymmetry between the players.
2. Linking the asymmetry with aggregate equilibrium effort in a two-player λ-contest
is in line with the standard result of the r-contest (Nti, 1999) and the α-contest
since aggregate equilibrium effort decreases in players’ asymmetry.
3. In an N -symmetric-players contest adding an additional player increases total effort
in the r-contest with an equilibrium in pure strategies and in the λ-contest, while
it may decrease total effort in the α-contest.
4. The λ-contest and r-contest can not sustain an equilibrium where all players are
inactive while this may occur in the α-contest.
4In their notation, Wi and Li denote winner and losers’ payoffs and the λ-contest is obtained for the
particular values Wi =
λV
ci
+ (1− λ) VciN and Li = (1− λ) VciN .
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2.2 Equivalence
Following the definitions by Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2014):5
Definition 1. k
• Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts.
• Contests are strategically equivalent if they result in the same best responses.
• Contests are payoff equivalent if in equilibrium they result in the same payoffs.
Following Alcalde and Dahm (2010) we use the effort-elasticity of the probability of
winning as a measure of noise in a contest j, i.e., νji (e1, ...eN) =
∂fji (e1,...eN )
∂ei
ei
fji (e1,...,eN )
and
pay attention to the case in which efforts are equalized.6
Definition 2. Two CSF j and k are noise equivalent if and only if νji (e
j
1, ...e
j
N) =
νki (e
k
1, ...e
k
N) for all i = 1, ..., N ; whenever e
j
1 = e
j
2 = ... = e
j
N and e
k
1 = e
k
2 = ... = e
k
N .
It can be shown, by comparing the α-CSF and the r-CSF, that none of the four
equivalence properties hold. We now restrict attention to the comparison between the λ
and r-contests.
Proposition 1. For any two-player r-contest with an equilibrium in pure strategies (i.e.,
r such that V r1 + V
r
2 > rV
r
2 ):
1. There exists an effort equivalent λ-contest with λ = r(V1V2)
r(V1+V2)2
V1V2(V r1 +V
r
2 )
2 .
2. There exists no strategically equivalent λ-contest (except for r = λ = 0 and r = λ =
1 when the two contests coincide).
3. There exists no payoff equivalent λ-contest (except for r = λ = 0, r = λ = 1 when
the two contests coincide and the symmetric case, c1 = c2).
Figure 1 illustrates the result for two asymmetric players. On the left, best responses
are different for the λ and r-contest but they intersect at the same effort equivalence
point. On the right panel, the value of λ that guarantees payoff equivalence for player 1
only coincides with that providing payoff equivalence for player 2 when the two contests
coincide (i.e., r = λ = 1 and r = λ = 0).
5In the case of a unique equilibrium (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011), strategic equivalence implies
effort equivalence while the opposite need not be true. Moreover, strategic equivalence need not imply
payoff equivalence (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2014).
6The all-pay auction (i.e., r → ∞) is considered a deterministic contest because in case of a tie, an
arbitrarily small amount of additional effort is sufficient to secure the prize (Alcalde and Dahm, 2010).
In contrast, a marginal increase in effort has no effect on the probability of winning when the two efforts
are not equal. This justifies measuring effort-elasticity at equal effort levels.
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Figure 1: Best response functions and effort equivalence on the left (r = 0.5, λ =
0.524729) and payoff equivalence on the right. For both graphs V1 = 20, V2 = 12.
Figure 2 illustrates how effort equivalence can be obtained through the appropriate
choice of value λ∗ for any given value r for a given level of asymmetry (V1/V2 = 10, in this
example). Notice that the value of λ∗ that guarantees an effort equivalent λ-contest, is
not monotonic in r. This occurs because while in the λ-contest individual and aggregate
equilibrium efforts are decreasing in the level of noise, this need not be true in the r-
contest. Note that, the level of λ that ensures effort equivalence might involve transfers
as in Hillman and Riley (1989). This depends on the exact level of asymmetry.
 

Figure 2: Effort equivalence value of λ, given any r such that an equilibrium in pure
strategies exists (V r1 + V
r
2 > rV
r
2 with V1/V2 = 10).
The result on noise equivalence is summarized in Proposition 2. Observe that for
asymmetric players the value of λ that guarantees noise equivalence differs from the
value that guarantees effort equivalence. Therefore one can obtain both effort and noise
equivalence with the same choice of λ only for symmetric players.
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Proposition 2. For any r-contest with r ∈ [0, 1], the λ-contest and the r-contest are
noise equivalent if and only if λ = r.
This result implies that for any r ∈ [0, 1], we can find a λ-contest with a comparable
level of noise. It is particularly important if we take into account that the r-contest has
no closed form solution when N ≥ 3. That is, for any r-contest with r ∈ [0, 1) and N ≥ 3,
although the r-contest does not have a closed form solution, there exists a noise equivalent
λ-contest with λ = r and a closed form solution. In contrast to the α-contest that also
provides a closed form solution, our proposal can also guarantee noise equivalence with
the original r-contest.
2.3 Participation
We have shown that for any r-contest, one can always find an effort equivalent λ-contest.
However, in the effort equivalent λ-contest the presence of transfers may be required (i.e.,
λ > 1, as in Figure 2 for r belonging to [0.41, 1]). These transfers in turn may violate
participation constraint (PC) as in Hillman and Riley (1989). The following remark
provides the conditions that guarantee voluntary participation.
Remark 2. In any λ-contest the PC is satisfied if
Vi
∑N
j=1
1
Vj
λ(N−1)+1
N
≥ λ(N − 1)(2− N−1
Vi
∑N
j=1
1
Vj
) ∀ i = 1, ..., N .
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Figure 3: Participation constraint in the effort equivalent λ-contest.
Intuitively, as long as λ is low, that is either no transfers are involved (λ ≤ 1) or
transfers are present but are not too punishing the PC is satisfied. Once the required
transfers become high enough, then low contributors are severely punished and are better
off not participating in the contest.7 The conditions under which the λ-equivalent contest
7The remark follows from condition (23) in Bevia´ and Corcho´n (2015, p. 387).
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does not satisfy the PC depend on the specific combination of cost asymmetry and noise
level.
In particular, for any two-player r-contest, although an effort-equivalent λ-contest
always exists, the latter fails to satisfy PC if
r(V1V2)
r(V1 + V2)
2
V1V2(V r1 + V
r
2 )
2
>
(V1 + V2)
2
V 21 + 2V1V2 − V 22
.
A graphical representation is given in Figure 3. The darkest area in the lower panel plots
the combinations of asymmetry V1/V2 and r for which the effort equivalent λ-contest does
not satisfy the PC. While the effort equivalent λ-contest satisfies the PC for any level
of r when players’ asymmetry is low, for higher levels of asymmetry the region of r for
which an effort equivalent λ-contest satisfies the PC shrinks.
3 Discussion
We propose the use of the λ-function as a tractable way of modeling noise while guaran-
teeing HD0. Depending on whether HD0 or Luce’s axiom is more relevant, we highlight
the choice between the λ-contest and the α-CSF proposed by Amegashie (2006). We also
show that the λ-contest can be effort or noise equivalent to an r-contest while several
equilibrium properties are similar to Tullock’s original proposal. The λ-contest can be
implemented in applications where the absence of closed form solutions induces focus
only on r = 1 (e.g., Franke 2012), while it can also be of interest for experiments given
the intuitive manner one can introduce noise in the lab.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
1. When N = 2 the condition for a player being active active in the λ-contest is
always satisfied. From Remark 1 the equilibrium effort of player i is ei =
V 2i Vjλ
(V1+V2)2
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. To prove effort equivalence equalize these equilibrium efforts with
the ones of the r-contest (Nti, 1999). Equilibrium efforts of the λ-contest coincide
with the ones of the r-contest for λ = r(V1V2)
r(V1+V2)2
V1V2(V r1 +V
r
2 )
2 .
2. Note that when r = λ = 0 or r = λ = 1 the λ-contest and the r-contest coincide,
hence strategic equivalence follows immediately in these cases. The best response
for player i in the λ-contest is ei(ej) = max{0,
√
ejViλ−ej} while it is not possible to
find a closed form solution for the best response of the r-contest. However, as shown
in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2014) effort equivalence is a necessary condition for
strategic equivalence. Therefore, strategic equivalence is guaranteed only if the first
order conditions of the r-contest are satisfied for any value of ej after substituting
the best responses of the λ-contest with λ = r(V1V2)
r(V1+V2)2
V1V2(V r1 +V
r
2 )
2 . This is true if and only
if
erjrVi(A)
r−1
(erj+(A)
r)2
= 1, where A = −ej +
√
ejVi
√
r(ViVj)r−1(Vi+Vj)2
(V ri +V
r
j )
2 which is not true for all
values of ej (only for the equilibrium one).
3. By plugin equilibrium efforts in the payoff of player 1 we obtain that the λ-contest
induces the same payoff as the one in the r-contest for λ =
(V1+V2)2(V 2r1 −V 2r2 −2r(V1V2)r)
(V 21 −2V1V2−V 22 )(V r1 +V r2 )2 =
λ1. Similarly, the λ-contest induces payoff equivalence for player 2 if and only if
λ =
(V1+V2)2(V 2r1 −V 2r2 +2r(V1V2)r)
(V 21 +2V1V2−V 22 )(V r1 +V r2 )2 = λ2. Normalizing V2 = 1 and V1/V2 = v we see that
λ1 = λ2, i.e., payoff equivalence, is only obtained for V1 = V2 or r = {0, 1} (when
the two contests coincide).
4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Player i effort-elasticity in the λ-contest is
e1
∑
j 6=i ejNλ
(e1+
∑
j 6=i ej)(
∑
j 6=i ej(1−λ)+e1(1+(N−1)λ)) which eval-
uated at ei = e ∀i = 1, ..., N is λN−1N . Player i effort-elasticity in the r-contest is
r
∑
j 6=i e
r
j
eri+
∑
j 6=i e
r
j
which evaluated at ei = e ∀i = 1, ..., N is rN−1N . Thus λ = r guarantees
noise-equivalence.
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